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THE INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF TOURNAMENTS REVISITED: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN PGA TOUR 
R O N A L D G. E H R E N B E R G and M I C H A E L L. B O G N A N N O * 
This analysis of data from the 1987 European Men's Professional Golf 
Association (PGA) 'four strongly supports the hypothesis that the level 
and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players' 
performance. Specifically, players' performance appears to vary 
positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and 
the marginal return to effort in the final round of play (a value chat 
varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is 
allocated among finishers of different ranks). The authors suggest that. 
these results, together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 
1984 U.S. Men's PGA Tour, may have implications for the design of 
compensation systems for certain groups of workers, such as corporate 
executives, college professors, and salespeople. 
ECONOMISTS have recently devoted con-siderable a t tent ion to models of tour 
namen t s , o r situations in which an individ-
ual's payment d e p e n d s only on his o u t p u t 
or rank relative to o the r competi tors .1 
Such models a re of m o r e than academic 
interest, as they may well describe the 
compensa t ion s t ructures applicable not 
only to professional sports t o u r n a m e n t s 
bu t to many corpora te executives (who can 
* Ronald Ehrenbeig is Irving M. Ives Professor of 
Industrial and Labor Relations and Economics at 
Cornell University and Research Associate at. the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, and Michael 
Bognanno is a Ph.D. candidate in Labor F.conomics 
at Cornell University. This paper is based on work 
supported by the National Science Foundation under 
Grant No. SES-8719592, and the authors thank the 
Foundation for its support. The data set used in the 
paper will be archived at the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research {P.O. 
Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106) as of 
January 1, 1991. 
1
 See I.azear and Rosen (1981), Carmichael (1983), 
Green and Stokey (1983), Malcomson (1984), Nale-
buff and Stiglitz (1984), O'Keefe, Viscusi, and 
Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (198fi), and McLaughlin 
(1988) for discussions of tournament theory. 
be t hough t of as compe t ing with col-
leagues for promot ions) , young college 
professors (who may be thought, of as 
compet ing with colleagues for tenure) , 
and sales people (whose bonuses often 
d e p e n d on their relative outputs) . 
Academic interest in t o u r n a m e n t mod-
els dei ives from the incentive effects that. 
such compensat ion s t ructures a re t hough t 
to have. In particular, u n d e r certain sets 
of assumptions t ou rnamen t s are though t 
to give part ic ipants an incentive to provide 
opt imal levels of effort.2 
Very few at tempts have been made , 
however , to test e i ther if t o u r n a m e n t s 
actually elicit desi red effort responses o r if 
executive compensat ion is genera ted by a 
tou rnamen t - type reward s t ruc ture . 3 T h e 
1
 These assumptions relate to the costs of monitor-
ing effort, asymmetric information, and the nature 
of random shocks to output/productivity. 
3
 Bull, Schotter, and Weigett (1987) is an experi-
mental study that used paid undergraduate student. 
volunteers as subjects to test whether tournaments 
elicit desired effort responses. O'Reilly et al. (1988) is 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, Special Issue (February 1990). 
0019-793 9/90/43SP $01.00 
bv Cornell University. 
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lack of studies that use corporate data is 
undoubtedly due to the difficulty of 
measuring both individual executives' ef-
fort levels and the incentive structures 
they face. 
In previous research we have examined 
data from professional golf tournaments 
in the United States to test whether 
tournaments do have the postulated incen-
tive effects (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
1988). Our focus was on golf tournaments 
because data were available for them on 
the incentives players face (the prize 
distribution in each tournament) and 
measures of each individual's output (the 
player's score). In addition, data were 
available to control for factors other than 
the prize structure that should affect a 
player's score in a tournament, such as the 
player's "quality," the "quality" of his 
opponents, the difficulty of the tourna-
ment's course, and the weather conditions 
during the tournament. Thus, our analysis 
could isolate the effect of the prize 
structure on player performance. In the 
main, the results presented in that paper 
indicated that tournaments' prize struc-
tures do affect players' performance. 
In the present paper we seek to test the 
robustness of our previous findings by 
performing a similar analysis using data 
from the 1987 European Men's Profes-
sional Golf Association (PGA) Tour. 
Analytical Framework 
Our econometric work is based on 
implications derived from simple two-
contestant models that capture the essence 
of the incentive problem.4 If one wishes, 
one can view the two-person tournament 
as a situation in which a contestant 
competes against "the rest of the field." 
Each individual's score in a tournament 
is assumed to depend on his effort/ 
concentration level, a pure random or 
a recent attempt to test whether executive compensa-
tion corresponds to a tournament structure. 
4
 Details of these models can be found in Lazear 
and Rosen (1981) and Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
(1988). Generalizations to the n-contestant case are 
found in Green and Stokey (1983) and elsewhere. 
luck component, and tournament-specific 
factors such as the difficulty of the course 
and the adversity of weather conditions. 
For simplicity, the last two factors are 
assumed to affect all players in a tourna-
ment equally. A key assumption in the 
model is that players choose their effort/ 
concentration levels. 
Of course, one may argue that treating 
the effort/concentration levels of profes-
sional golfers as choice variables does not 
make sense because professionals always 
play as hard as they can.5 What this 
criticism ignores, however, is how difficult 
it is even for professionals to maintain 
their concentration levels over tourna-
ments that typically last four days per 
week and that involve four to five hours of 
physical effort per day. Furthermore, 
playing on the PGA European Tour 
involves weekly international travel and 
living out of hotel rooms. At the very least, 
one might expect fatigue to set in during 
the latter days of each tournament and 
players' ability to maintain their concentra-
tion to diminish at these times. To capture 
this effect, we assume that each individual 
faces a "cost of effort/concentration" func-
tion and that the marginal cost of effort is 
positive and increases as effort increases. 
Given a prize differential for winning, 
each player is assumed to choose his effort 
level to maximize his expected utility. If, 
furthermore, we posit that each player 
assumes his opponent is similarly choosing 
his optima] strategy, a solution can be 
found for each player's optimal effort/ 
concentration level and thus his score. In 
particular, 
(1) <& = 
Uji ((u>u - via), AJo,Ajc) + «£ + 5 ;. 
Here fy is individual fs score in tourna-
ment i, Wi,- — W2i is the prize differential 
for winning, A,0,AjC are measures of the 
player's own ability and his competitor's 
ability respectively, 5; reflects the tourna 
5
 In fact, the U.S. PGA Tour's 1984 Player's 
Handbook (1984) states that "in making a commitment 
to play in a PGA Tour cosponsored or approved 
event, a player obligates himself to exercise his 
maximum golf skill and to ptay in a professional 
manner" (p. 58). 
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ment-specific factors, and e;!- is a random 
error term. Equation (1) states that a 
player's score in a tournament depends on 
the prize differential for winning, how 
"good" the player is relative to his oppo-
nent, tournament-specific factors such as 
the weather and course difficulty, and a 
random error term. One crucial implica-
tion of this model is that higher prize 
differentials for winning should lead play-
ers to exert more effort/concentration and 
thus should result in better (that is, lower) 
scores. 
The 1987 Men's European 
Professional Golf Tour 
The typical golf tournament has four 
rounds. Half the field is "cut" at the end of 
the second round, two additional rounds 
are played, and then prizes are awarded 
on the basis of the players' ranks after the 
final round. Of the 29 tournaments on the 
1987 European Men's Professional Golf 
Association Tour, 27 were of this type, 
and data from 23 of these are used in our 
analysis.6 
Across these tournaments the structure 
of the allocation of prize money by rank 
was virtually identical, although the level 
of prize money varied across tournaments.7 
Figure 1 summarizes this structure. An 
important effect of the prize structure is 
that it gave a much higher marginal 
return for improving one's performance 
by one rank (or not seeing one's perfor-
mance decline by one rank) to players who 
6
 See Pro-Golf ,SS: The Official PGA European Tour 
Gm.de (1988). The six tournaments not included in 
the sample were two match-play tournaments that 
had different formats and much smaller Fields 
(Epson Grand Prix of Europe Match-Play, Dunhill 
Cup Nations Tournament), two tournaments that 
were interrupted after three rounds because of the 
weather (Volvo Belgian Open, Portuguese Open), a 
tournament open only to golfers aged 50 and older 
(Senior British Open), and the Open Golf Champi-
onship, in which the eligibility criteria and the prize 
structure differed from those in the other tourna-
ments. A listing of the 23 tournaments included in 
the sample and the total prize money awarded in 
each appears in Appendix Table Al. 
7
 See Pro-Golf '88: The Official PGA European Tour 
Guide (1988). 
;».*.».*.».v.-r*------.----------
were close to the leaders after three 
rounds than to players who were far from 
the leaders. For example, the marginal 
prize received for finishing second instead 
of third was approximately 5 percent of 
the total tournament prize money, whereas 
the marginal price received for finishing 
nineteenth instead of twentieth was less 
than 0.1 percent of the total tournament 
prize money.8 
This structure of prizes, coupled with 
variations in the level of prizes across 
tournaments, suggests two types of tests of 
the theory sketched in the preceding 
section. First, since the structure of prizes 
is constant across tournaments, the prize 
differential for "winning" depends only 
on the level of total prize money. Thus, 
one can focus on a tournament as a whole 
and ask, other things equal, if higher total 
prize money leads to lower scores for the 
tournament as a whole. Second, one can 
focus only on the last round of a tourna-
ment and ask if a player's performance in 
the last round depends, other things 
equal, on the marginal return to effort. 
The marginal return to effort will depend, 
in turn, on the total prize money in the 
tournament, the player's rank after the 
third round, and how many players arc-
tightly bunched around him after three 
rounds. The results of both of these types 
of analysis are reported in the next 
section. 
Before turning to the empirical results, 
however, we must discuss one institutional 
complication. Not every pro golfer who 
wanted to enter any given European PGA 
tournament in 1987 could do so. Rather, a 
system of exemptions and priorities ex-
isted. At the risk of simplifying a very 
complex system, we would describe it as 
follows:9 
Appendix Table A2 presents data on the mean 
level and share of prize money won expost for players 
at various ranks in these tournaments. Because of lies 
in some tournaments for some ranks, the expobt share 
of the prize money won at each rank is not identical 
across tournaments. 
9
 See Pro Golf '88: the Official PGA European Tour 
Guide (1988), pp. 55-57. In addition to the distinc-
tions noted in the text, members of the European 
Ryder Cup Team fell in group (ii), past winners of a 
' . ' . V ^ r ' r W V l . l . ' . l . • • '• • • .1 .1^ . ' . 
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Percent 
of Total 
Prize Money 
< . i % { : . 
Player's Rank 
in Tournament 
Figure 1. Sha re of Tota l Prize Money Going to Players of Different Ranks: Sample f rom 1987 
Men's E u r o p e a n PGA T o u r n a m e n t . 
(i) A n y g o l f e r w h o h a d w o n a n y " m a j o r " 
tournament after 1977 or any European 
PGA Tour tournament in 1986 could 
enter any tournament he wanted in both 
1987 and 1988. 
(ii) Any golfer who failed to qualify 
under (i) and had won a specified major 
tournament in 1977 or any European 
PGA Tour tournament in 1985 could 
enter any tournament he wanted in 1987 
but had no promise of entry for tourna-
ments in 1988. 
(iii) If all positions in a 1987 tournament 
were not filled by individuals from catego-
ries (i) and (ii), any golfer who was among 
the top 40 career money winners as of 
1986 or was among the top 128 money 
winners on the 1986 European PGA Tour 
could enter the tournament. 
(iv) Any remaining vacancies in a tour-
specific tournament received an exemption for that 
specific tournament, and each tournament sponsor 
was allowed to invite a specified number of players to 
participate in his or her tournament. 
nament were filled with players who met 
other criteria (for example, lower-ranked 
players on the 1986 tour, and leaders 
from the European PGA Tour Qualifying 
School). 
As we shall show, this system of exemp-
tions and priorities helps to explain which 
players entered which 1987 PGA Tour 
tournaments. This consideration is impor-
tant because analyses that use data on the 
scores of entrants to tournaments may be 
subject to potential selectivity biases. In 
addition, individuals in categories (ii), 
(iii), and (iv) had to be very concerned 
about their total tour earnings in 1987, for 
unless they won a PGA Tour tournament 
during the year, they had to finish in the 
top 128 money winners during the year in 
order to be assured of virtual automatic 
entry (if they desired) to European PGA 
Tour tournaments in 1988 (that is, to be in 
category (iii) in 1988). In contrast, no 
matter what individuals in category (i) 
accomplished during the 1987 tour, they 
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were assured the option of entry into any 
European PGA Tour tournament that 
they wanted to enter in 1988. 
Suppose that the latter (category (i)) 
group, whom we refer to henceforth as 
the exempt players, exhibited effort levels 
that were sensitive to the level and 
structure of prizes in a tournament. 
Because the former (category (ii), (iii), and 
(iv)) group, whom we henceforth refer to 
as the nonexempt players, had to worry 
about qualifying for the next year's tour, 
the level and structure of prize money in a 
tournament may not be an accurate 
indicator of their marginal Financial re-
turn to effort. Rather, one would need to 
know also how an increase in effort for 
one of them increased both the probability 
that he would be classified as an exempt 
player in 1988 and his expected future 
earnings if he was so classified. As such, 
even if the exempt and nonexempt play-
ers' marginal responses to financial re-
turns were equal, one might intuitively 
expect nonexempt players' effort levels, 
and hence scores, to be less sensitive than 
those of exempt players to tournament-
specific prize variables.10 
Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two 
stages: first we estimate final score equa-
tions for players on the 1987 European 
Men's PGA Tour; then we estimate final 
round score equations. 
Final Score Equations 
Pro Golf '88: The Official PGA European 
Tour Guide (1988) provides data for each 
1987 Men's PGA European Tournament 
on the score by round, final rank, and 
prize money won for all players who 
entered and made the cut.11 Data on each 
player's scoring average on all rounds 
' " T h e appendix to Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
(1988) presents a simple omitted variable model that 
indicates the precise conditions under which this 
expectation is correct. 
' The restriction to players who entered and 
made the cut leads to potential selectivity problems, 
and we discuss this issue below. (See note 16.) 
during the year, a measure of his "ability," 
are available only for the top 130 money 
winners during the year; consequently, the 
analysis reported below is restricted to 
these individuals.12 
Equations were estimated (pooling the 
data across individuals and tournaments) 
of the form 
(2) Sji ~ a0 + rtiTPRlZE; + flaMAJ; 
Here, s^ is the Final score of individual j in 
tournament i, TPR1ZE, is the total prize 
money awarded in the tournament, MAJ, 
takes on the value of one if tournament i is 
a major tournament and zero otherwise, Xi 
is a vector of variables to control for the 
difficulty of the tournament course, yj is a 
vector of proxies for player/s ability, z; is a 
vector of variables to control for the 
quality of other players in the tournament, 
and Vji is a random error term.13 If the 
theory of tournaments is correct, higher 
prizes should lead to lower scores, and 
estimates of a\ should therefore be nega-
tive. Similarly, since winning a major 
tournament typically provides a golfer 
with endorsement opportunities and also 
provides him with guaranteed entiy to all 
tournaments for a number of years, 
estimates of a^ should also be negative.M 
The controls for the difficulty of the 
course are PAR, the par for the tourna-
1
 As a result, virtually no individuals from 
category (iv) are included in the sample, 
1
 Our earlier study of U.S. golf tournaments 
included a measure of the weather conditions during 
each tournament as an explanatory variable. Unfor-
tunately, such a measure could not be constructed 
for this paper, as detailed descriptions of the weather 
on each day of each tournament were not readily 
available to us. As long as weather conditions are 
uncorrected with ilie other explanatory variables in 
the model, the omission of that factor will reduce the 
model's explanatory power but not lead to biased 
estimates of any of the other coefficients. 
14
 The five "major" tournaments are the PGA 
Championship, the Open Championship, the TFC, 
the European Open, and the European Masters. The 
TPC was not played in 1987 and, as noted above, the 
Open Championship was not included in our sample. 
Hence, MAJ takes on the value of unity in our sample 
for the PGA, European Open, and European 
Masters tournaments. 
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ment course; and YARDS, the total course 
yardage. Player ability is proxied by SAVE, 
his scoring average on all rounds played 
during the 1987 European tour; and 
SPARR, his average number of strokes per 
round worse ( + ) or better ( - ) than par 
for all rounds he played during the 1987 
European tour. Finally, the quality of the 
other players in the field is proxied by 
MSAVE and MSPARR, the mean values of 
SAVE and SPARR respectively, for all 
players who finished in the tournament, 
and by TOP20, the number of the top 20 
money winners on the 1987 Men's PGA 
European Tour who Finished in the 
tournament. 
Estimates of equation (2) are reported 
in Table 1 and descriptive statistics for the 
variables used are found in Table 2- More 
difficult courses, as measured by higher 
pars or longer yardage, are associated with 
high scores. Similarly, the better the 
player, as measured by lower values of 
either SAVE or SPARR, the lower the 
player's score will be. Most striking, the 
coefficients of MAj in columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 1 imply that players' scores, ceteris 
paribus, average more than one stroke 
lower in the major tournaments. Similarly, 
the coefficient of TPRIZE is negative as 
anticipated, TPRIZE is measured in thou-
sands of pounds; hence, the results in 
columns (1) and (2) imply that increasing 
the total prize money by £60,000 would be 
associated with each player scoring, on 
average, about three strokes less during a 
tournament. During 1987, the exchange 
rate averaged about .6 pounds per dollar, 
so this change in prize money is roughly 
equivalent to $100,000.15 In our earlier 
paper, we found that an increase in prize 
money of this magnitude would cause the 
score of the typical golfer on the 1984 U.S. 
PGA Men's Tour to fall (improve) by 
about 1.1 strokes during a tournament 
(Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1988, Table 1). 
Apparently, golfers' performances are 
more sensitive to prize levels on the 
European tour than on the U.S. tour. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 present 
15
 Economic Report of the President (1988), Table 
B-108. 
estimates of specifications in which TPRIZE 
and MAJ are interacted with a variable that 
indicates whether, as of the start of the 
1987 tour, the player has already automat-
ically qualified to enter tournaments on 
the next year's (1988) Men's European 
PGA Tour (EXEM). The negative coeffi-
cient of the interaction term with TPRIZE 
suggests, as noted above, either that 
exempt players' effort levels are more 
responsive to financial variables, or that 
the nonexempt players' TPRIZE coefficient 
is biased toward zero because their mar-
ginal return to effort also depends both 
upon how doing well in a tournament 
increases their probability of being classi-
fied as exempt in the next year and upon 
their expected increase in the present 
value of future income if so classified.16 
Although not central to our discussion 
here, it is also of interest to know which 
factors influence players' decisions to 
enter tournaments. Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 3 present estimates of probit proba-
bility of entry equations. The probability is 
specified to be a function of a player's total 
career earnings prior to 1987 (PRCASH), 
his age (AGE), the order of the tournament 
in the year and its square (TCODE, TCODE2) 
, b T h e results in Table 1 may be subject to two 
types of selection bias because the sample is restricted 
to the subset of players who both entered and made 
the cut in each tournament. Consequently, we may 
confound the effect of the total prize variable on 
players' final scores with its effect on their probability 
of entering and making the cut in a tournament. 
Controlling for this possible problem requires the 
use of information on the players who entered each 
tournament and failed to make the cut; fortunately, 
such information is found in Pro Golf '88; The Official 
PGA European Tour Guide (1988). 
To model separately the decision to enter a 
tournament and the probability of making the cut 
and then to estimate a bivariate selection model is a 
difficult task. Instead, we approximated this process 
and estimated a univariate probit probability of 
entering and making the cut equation. Following the 
approach initially suggested by James Heckman 
(1979), we then used estimates from this equation to 
compute an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio for 
each individual and entered the latter as an 
additional explanatory variable in equation (2) to 
control for selectivity bias. When these "augmented" 
equations were estimated, the selectivity bias adjust-
ment procedure was seen to have virtually no effect 
on the TPRIZE coefficients. 
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Table 1. Final Score Equat ions for the 1987 PCA Men's E u r o p e a n Tour: Data Pooled Across 
T o u r n a m e n t s a n d Players. 
(Absolute Value t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
Variable 
Intercept 
TPRIZE 
TPR1ZE.EXEM 
MA] 
MAJ*F,XEM 
PAR 
YARDS 
SAVE 
MSAVE 
SPARR 
MSPARR 
TOP20 
E2 
n 
(1) 
-1,208.233 
- .050 
-1 .177 
2.411 
.004 
3.026 
14.892 
1.309 
.434 
1,386 
(6.2) 
(10.6) 
(2.0) 
(6.0) 
(2.4) 
(16.9) 
(5.4) 
(10.3) 
(2) 
21.442 (1.0) 
- . 050 (11.1) 
-1 .307 (2.2) 
3.216 (8.3) 
.003 (1.8) 
3.042 (17.2) 
18.511 (6.9) 
1.495 (11.7) 
.444 
1,386 
m 
- 1,201.470 
- . 0 4 9 
- . 004 
-1 .287 
.451 
2.412 
.003 
2.903 
14.921 
1.315 
.438 
1,386 
(6.2) 
(10.4) 
(1.7) 
(2-0) 
(0.3) 
(6.0) 
(2.4) 
(15.1) 
(5.4) 
(10.3) 
(4) 
21.764 (1.0) 
- .050 (11.0) 
- . 004 (1.5) 
-1.400 (2.2) 
.377 (0.3) 
3.214 (8.3) 
.003 (1.8) 
2.935 (15.3) 
18.546 (6.9) 
1.500 (11.7) 
.445 
1,386 
TPRlZE: total tournament prize money, in hundreds of British pounds. 
EXEM: 1= player has automatically qualified to enter tournaments on the 1988 Men's European PGA tour; 
0 = not automatically qualified. 
MAJ: la=PGA, European Masters, or European Open Tournament; 0 = other. 
PAR: par for the tournament course. 
YARDS: course yardage. 
SAVE: player's scoring average on all rounds played during the 1987 European tour, 
MSAVE: mean value of SAVE for all players who finished the tournament. 
SPARR: player's average number of strokes worse ( + ) or better ( - ) than par for all rounds played during the 
1987 European tour. 
MSPAR: mean value of SPARR for all players who finished the tournament. 
TOP20: number of the top 20 money winners on the 1987 PGA Men's European tour who finished the 
tournament. 
Source: Authors' calculations from data in Pro-Golf '88: Volvo Tour, The Official PGA European Tour Guide 
(1988). 
to allow for seasonal patterns, the total 
tournament prize money (TPRIZE), whether 
the tournament is a major tournament 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the 
Variables Used in the Final Score Equations. 
Variable 
TSCORE 
TPRIZE 
EXEM 
MAJ 
PAR 
YARDS 
SAVE 
MSAVE 
SPARR 
MSPARR 
TOP20 
Mean 
286.57 
199.32 
0.19 
0.13 
71.83 
6,837.58 
72.02 
72.03 
0.31 
0.31 
12.63 
Stan-
dard 
Devia-
tion. 
8.66 
56.45 
0.39 
0.33 
0.68 
210.58 
0.97 
0.17 
0.98 
0.18 
3.59 
Mini-
mum 
Value 
259.00 
98.17 
0.00 
0.00 
69.00 
6,198.00 
69.19 
71.61 
- 2 . 5 8 
-0 .11 
5.00 
Maxi-
mum 
Value 
319.00 
339.09 
1.00 
1.00 
73.00 
7,362.00 
74.63 
72.33 
2.98 
0.60 
20.00 
(MAJ), and the player's quality (SAVE in 
column (1), SPARR in column (2)). Coeffi-
cient estimates are permitted to vary 
between exempt and nonexempt players, 
and an "A" before a variable's name 
indicates that the coefficient is for exempt 
players, whereas a "B" indicates that it is 
for nonexempt players. 
Both exempt and nonexempt players 
are seen to be more likely to enter major 
tournaments and tournaments in which 
the total prize money is higher.17 An 
income effect on labor supply is evident 
for exempt players since, ceteris paribus, the 
greater an exempt player's lifetime earn-
TSCORE: player's total number of strokes over the 
four rounds of the tournament. 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
' Recall that only the top 130 money winners on 
the tour are included in our sample. Thus, if a 
decrease in a variable reduces the likelihood of entry 
for both exempt and nonexempt players in a 
tournament, an implication is that the decrease also 
permits more players who are not among the top 130 
money winners to enter the tournament. 
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Table 3, 1987 PGA Men's E u r o p e a n T o u r : 
Probit Probability of Entry . 
(Absolute Va lue t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
Probability of Entry 
Variable 
Intercept 
EXEM 
APRCASH' 
AAGE 
ATCODEb 
ATCODE21' 
ATPRIZEb 
AMAJ 
ASAVE 
ASPARR 
BPRCASH' 
BAGE 
B'I'GOUE 
BTCODE2 
BTPRlZEh 
BMAJ 
BSAVE 
BSPARR 
X2 (DOF) 
PE = 0 
PE = 1 
0) 
-12.889 
10.613 
(5.3) 
(2.0) 
- . 1 2 9 (4.7) 
- . 1 1 2 
- . 211 
- .002 
.268 
.645 
.041 
.115 
- .014 
.070 
- . 0 0 3 
.106 
.421 
.185 
149.169 
828 
2,185 
(1.2) 
(0.1) 
(0.0) 
(1.7) 
(2.8) 
(0.7) 
(4.0) 
(2.5) 
(4.3) 
(4.9) 
(1.6) 
(4.4) 
(5-5) 
(15) 
(2) 
- . 125 (0.6) 
.338 (0.6) 
- . 0 9 4 (3.3) 
- . 0 1 2 (1.2) 
.237 (0.1) 
- . 0 0 3 (0.0) 
.265 (1.7) 
.628 (2.8) 
.010 (2.6) 
.116 (3.8) 
- . 012 (2.1) 
.070 (4.4) 
- . 003 (4.9) 
.108 (1.6) 
.419 (4.3) 
.009 (4.6) 
145.670 (15) 
828 
2,185 
a
 Coefficient has been multiplied by 105. 
b
 Coefficient has been multiplied by 102. 
An "A" before a variable name indicates the 
variable's coefficient for exempt players, and a " B " 
before a variable's name indicates its coefficient for 
nonexempt players. 
FRCASH: total career earnings prior to 1987. 
AGE: age . 
TCODE: tournament code, in chronological order 
(equals 1 for the first tournament). 
TCODE2: tournament code squared. 
PE: 1= entered the tournament; 0 = did not enter the 
tournament. 
See Table 1 for all other variable definitions. 
ings, the lower his probability of entering 
a tournament. In contrast, the greater the 
lifetime earnings of nonexempt players, 
the more likely they will enter tourna-
ments. Older nonexempt players enter 
fewer tournaments. Finally, better players, 
as measured by lower values of SPARR, 
enter fewer tournaments. 
Final Round Score Equations 
Consider a golfer playing in two tourna-
ments with the same total prize money. 
Suppose he scores a 72 on each of the first 
three days of both tournaments but, 
because of random factors that influence 
his opponents' performance, he finds 
himself in third place in the first tourna-
ment but in twentieth place in the second 
tournament. Given the structure of PGA 
tournament prizes (Figure 1), he faces a 
greater marginal return to effort/concen-
tration in the first tournament, should ex-
ert more effort/concentration there, and, 
on average, should have a lower final round 
score in that tournament. Put another way, 
we should expect to observe, ceteris paribus, 
a positive correlation between a player's 
rank after the third round of tournaments 
and his final round scores. 
The results of an initial test of this 
hypothesis are shown in Table 4. Here, we 
have estimated final round score equa-
tions, using data pooled across individuals 
and tournaments. A player's score on the 
final round of a tournament is specified to 
be a function of his scores on the first 
three days of the tournament (SCORE l, 
SCORE2, SCORE3), his rank after the third 
round (RANK3RD), and the total tourna-
ment prize money (TPRIZE). A player's 
scores on the first three days, which are 
probably the best predictor of how well he 
is currently playing, should be positively 
associated with his score on the final day. 
Given his scores on the first three days, 
higher rank (poorer relative position) 
after the third round should lead to 
higher final round scores, and higher total 
prize money should lead to lower final 
round scores. The total prize level should 
matter because a higher average prize 
level leads to larger prize differences 
between players of different ranks. 
A player's scores on the first three days 
of a tournament are not exogenous, but 
rather depend (from equation (1)) on the 
prize differential for winning, measures of 
his ability and his opponents' ability, and 
tournament-specific factors such as course 
difficulty. Similarly, neither is a player's 
rank after the third round exogenous. It 
depends on his scores and his opponents' 
scores on the first three days—both of 
which depend, in turn, on the factors 
described above. As such, we treat SCOREi, 
SCORE2, SCORES, a n d RANK3RD as e n d o g e -
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Table 4. Final R o u n d Score Equat ions for the 1987 PGA Men's E u r o p e a n T o u r : Data Pooled 
Across T o u r n a m e n t s and Players.11 
(Absolute Value t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
Variable 
All Players 
(I) 
Constant 
SCORE 1 
SCORES 
SCORES 
RANKSRD 
TPR1ZE 
23.889 (3.2) 
.330 (1.5) 
.726 (3.8) 
- . 384 (2.4) 
.095 (5.2) 
- .012 (4.8) 
.128 
1,377 
Nonexemp 
(2, 
24.894 
.271 
.693 
- . 307 
.089 
- .012 
.111 
1,117 
t Players 
1 
(3.1) 
(1.1) 
(3.2) 
(1.8) 
(3.9) 
(4.2) 
Exentbt i 
0, 
28.508 
.064 
.790 
- .242 
.075 
- . 013 
.176 
260 
n/«V(Tj 
) 
(1.7) 
(0.2) 
(3.0) 
(<>.7) 
(2.4) 
(2.3) 
SCORE l: player's first round score in the tournament. 
SCORES?: player's second round score in the tournament. 
SCORES: player's third round score in the tournament. 
RAN KURD: player's rank after the third round of the tournament. 
TPRtZE: total tournament prize money (in thousands). 
"Instruments for SCOEE1, SCORED, SCORES, RANKSRD were obtained using TPRIZE, PAR. YARDS, jura; , MSPVSR. 
MSAVE, SPARR, SAVE, and MAJ (which are all defined in Table 1) and: 
AGE: player's age (in years). 
MERIT: player's official prize money winnings rank in the year. 
SCORESA: player's scoring average on all third rounds he played on the 1987 tour. 
nous, and the estimates in Table 4 are 
obtained using an instrumental variable 
method.18 
Quite striking, as expected, is the evi-
dence in Table 4 that the higher the rank 
of a player (the poorer his relative 
position) after the third day of a tourna* 
rnent, the higher his final round score will 
be. Moreover, again as expected, the 
higher the total prize money in a tourna-
ment, the lower his score will be.lfl 
The specific variables used to obtain the 
instruments are listed in the notes to Table 4. Format 
specification tests permit us to reject the hypothesis 
that this set of variables should be treated as 
exogenous. See Hausroan (1978) for these tests. 
x
" These results are contingent upon SCORE:, 
SCORES, SCORES, and RANKSRD being treated as 
endogenous. When they are treated as exogenous, 
the coefficient of ITRIZE remains negative but the 
coefficient of RANK3RD switches sign and becomes 
negative (significantly so for the all player and 
nonexempt samples). As noted in footnote 18, 
formal specification tests allow us to reject the 
hypothesis that the above set of variables should be 
treated as exogenous. 
The results in Table 4 also suggest that a player's 
score on the second round of a tournament is an 
important explanatory variable for his final round 
score, but that the scores on this first and third 
rounds are less important. It may be that players play 
"harder" on the second round, when they are aware 
what it will take to make the cut, and on the fourth 
round, when the "money is at stake." Of course, such 
Of course, entering a player's rank after 
three rounds and total tournament prize 
money separately only approximates the 
marginal return to effort/concentration 
that he faces if he improves his rank by a 
given number of units. Such a specifica-
tion also does not take into account how 
closely his competitors are "bunched" 
around him. To obtain more orecise 
measures of the relevant marginal returns, 
we defined six different variables, all of 
which are illustrated in Figure 2, 
Suppose that the curve PP in Figure 2 
shows the relationship between a player's 
final rank in a tournament and the prize 
money he will be awarded. Consider an 
individual who after the third round is at 
rank R. If he remains at that rank, he will 
be awarded the amount OA at the end of 
the tournament. 
The first three marginal return vari-
ables we compute ignore how tightly 
competitors are bunched around the player 
and are based on the returti to improving 
performance, or of having it get worse, by 
an explanation suggests that players' behavior is 
somewhat irrational, as it is their total score after two 
rounds that determines if they make the cut, and 
their total score after four thai determines their prize 
winnings. 
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Prize for 
Finishing 
at Rank 
Player's Rank 
T S R - 1 R R + 1 in Tournament 
Figure 2. Alternat ive Measures of Marginal R e t u r n to Effor t /Concentra t ion in a T o u r n a m e n t . 
o n e r a n k . 2 0 DPRIZE3 is t h e e s t i m a t e d 
decrease in prize money if the individual's 
rank at the end of the tournament was one 
higher (worse) than his current rank. It is 
given by our estimate of AD. UPRIZE3 is 
the estimated increase in prize money the 
individual would gain if he improved his 
rank by one; this is given by AC in the 
Figure. MIDPRIZ3 assumes the individual 
takes into account the cost of losing one 
20
 The marginal return variables were computed 
from the following equation, which was estimated 
using data on all players who finished each of the 
tournaments in the sample: 
log(Sr;) -5 .384 -• 1.031(log(ri) R2 = .920 
(.025) (.008) 
Here, Sn is the share of the total prize money in a 
tournament that went to the person who finished in 
the rth place in tournament i, ri is that individual's 
rank in the tournament, and standard errors of the 
estimates are found beneath the estimated coeffi-
rank and the benefit from improving one 
rank. It is defined as the estimated 
average absolute change in prize money if 
the rank at the end of the tournament is 
either one lower or one higher than R, 
and it is given in the figure by the average 
of the lengths of AC and AD. 
Presumably, increased effort/concentra-
tion directly affects a player's score, not his 
rank. The effect of increased concentra-
tion on rank then depends on the number 
of competitors closely bunched around the 
player. The next three measures take this 
factor into account; they are the estimated 
increase in prize money the individual 
would receive if he improved his scores 
relative to his competitors by one stroke 
(LESIPRIZ), two strokes (LES2PRIZ), or three 
strokes (LES3PRIZ). Assuming that improve-
ments of one, two, and three strokes 
would cause the individual's rank to 
improve respectively to S, T, and U in the 
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Table 5. Coefficients of the Marginal Re tu rn to Effort Variables in the f inal Round Score 
Equat ions for the 1987 PGA Men's E u r o p e a n T o u r : Data Pooled Across 
T o u r n a m e n t s and Players. 
(Absolute Value t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
Specification All Pkiyers Nonexempt Players 
(1) DPRIZL 
(2) UPKIZE 
MIOPRIZE 
1.ES1PRIZ 
{3} 
(4) 
(5) LKS2PRIZ 
(6) LES3PR1Z 
- . 570 
- .794 
- .692 
-1.050 
- .435 
- .244 
(4.9) 
(4.2) 
(4.9) 
(3.7) 
(4.1) 
(3.5) 
.936 (3.0) 
- . 8 9 5 
- . 961 
-1 .103 
- . 500 
- .271 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.0) 
Exempt Platers 
- .148 (1.5) 
.159 (1.0) 
-.20H (1.5) 
- .384 (1,3) 
- . 145 (1.6) 
- .091 (1.1) 
DPRIZE: estimated marginal reduction in prize money (in OOO's) if rank at the end of the tournament is one 
higher (worse) than the player's third round rank. 
UPR1ZE: estimated marginal Increase in prize money (in OOO's) if milk at the end of the tournament is one lower 
(better) than the player's third >"Ound rank. 
MIDPRIZE: estimated average marginal absolute change in prize money (in OOO's) if rank at the end of the 
tournament is one lower or one higher than the individual's third round rank. 
i.ESIPRIZ: estimated marginal increase in prize money (in OOO's) if the individual improved his rank after the 
third round by reducing his score by 1 stroke relative to the rest of the field (I.ES2PRI7 — 2 strokes; L.F.s.lPRt? —3 
strokes). 
a
 All specifications also include SCORF.I, SCORE2, and SCORES and use instruments for these variables arid the 
marginal return to effort variables. 
figure, these variables' magnitudes in turn 
would be given by AE, AF, and AG. 
Each of these six variables was estimated 
for each individual in each tournament. 
Each variable in turn was substituted for 
RANK3RD and TPRJZE, and equations simi-
lar to those reported in Table 4 were 
estimated. Because each of these marginal 
return to effort variables depends on a 
player's rank after the third round and the 
latter is endogenous, instruments were 
also used for each of these variables. 
Estimates of the coefficients of the 
marginal return to effort variables from 
these equations are reported in Table 5. 
The pattern of results is remarkably 
consistent across specifications. The mar-
ginal prize variables do affect players' 
scores on the final round, with larger 
marginal rewards to effort resulting in 
lower final round scores.21 In contrast to 
the findings in our total score equations 
(Table 1), the size and significance of these 
21
 Again, formal specification tests allow us to 
reject the hypotheses that the set of earlier round 
score variables, and each of these variables, should be 
treated as exogenous. This finding is important, 
because if one erroneously treats diose variables as 
exogenous, the coefficients of all the marginal prize 
variables switch signs and become positive (signifi-
cantly so in most cases for the nonexempt and all 
player samples). 
responses appear to be larger for nonex-
empt players. 
One may argue that, in theory, a 
player's effort on the last round of a 
tournament also depends on his ability 
relative to the players who are closely 
bunched around him. To see how inclu-
sion of such measures would influence the 
importance of financial variables, we com-
puted for each player in each tournament 
the average ability of players who were 
within one, two, and three strokes of him, 
in either direction, at the end of the third 
round of play in the tournament. These 
variables (one at a time), plus a measure of 
the player's ability, were added to the 
specifications that underlie Table 5, and 
these extended equations were estimated 
for the entire sample. Since the average 
quality of the players around a player 
after the third round is endogenous, 
instruments for these average quality 
variables were also used. 
Table 6 summarizes the coefficients of 
the marginal prize variables that result 
when those changes are made. Column (1) 
simply repeats the coefficients found in 
column (1) of Table 5 that came from 
specifications that did not control for the 
quality of "nearby" opponents. Columns 
(2), (3), and (4), respectively, present the 
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Table 6. Coefficients of the Marginal R e t u r n to Effort Variables in the Final R o u n d Score 
Equat ions for the 1987 Men's E u r o p e a n PGA T o u r : Control l ing for Quali ty of Players Nearby 
After T h r e e R o u n d s . 3 
(Absolute Value t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
Marginal Return 
Variable 
(1) DPRliE 
(2) UPR1ZE 
(3) MTDPR1ZE 
(4) L1ESIPR1Z 
(5) LESi'PRIZ 
(6) I.ES3PR1Z 
None 
(i) 
- . 570 (4.9) 
- . 794 (4.2) 
- . 6 9 2 (4.9) 
-1 .050 (3.7) 
- . 4 3 5 (4.1) 
- . 244 (3.5) 
Control for 
AVESPAR1 
(2) 
- . 296 (2.1) 
- . 428 (2.1) 
- .371 (2.2) 
- . 6 9 3 (2.5) 
- . 280 (2.5) 
- . 152 (2.0) 
"Quality" 
AVESPAR2 
(3) 
- .231 (1.6) 
- . 3 3 0 (1.6) 
- . 290 (1.7) 
- .622 (2.3) 
- . 2 4 8 (2.2) 
- . 1 2 6 (1.7) 
AVESPAR9 
(4) 
- . 231 (1.6) 
- . 3 3 8 (1.7) 
- . 2 9 2 (1.7) 
- . 611 (2.2) 
- . 2 4 7 (2.3) 
- . 130 (1.7) 
a
 Specifications are the same as those found in Table 5, with the addition in all but the first column of 
measures of the player's ability (SPAR) and the ability of other players close to him after the third round 
(AVESPARI, AVESPAR2, or AVESPAR3). Since the latter variable is endogenous, instruments for it are also used. 
AVESPARI : average number of strokes from par per round during the year of all players within one stroke of the 
player after third round of the tournament. 
AVESPAR2: same as AVESPARI but within two strokes. 
AVESPAR3: same as AVESPARI but within three strokes. 
coefficients from specifications that con-
trol for the quality of other golfers within 
one, two, and three strokes of the player, 
respectively, after the third round. 
Quite strikingly, although the magni-
tudes and the statistical significance of the 
marginal prize variables decline when the 
controls for average competitor quality are 
present, larger marginal prizes are still 
associated with lower Final round scores. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on all of the 
marginal prize variables remain statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for 
each of the marginal prize variables. One 
can use these data and the estimates in 
Table 6 to obtain estimates of the influ-
ence of these variables on players' perfor-
mance. For example, ceteris paribus, one 
can estimate for LES1PRIZ and LES2PR1Z 
how much better those players will per-
form whose marginal prize is one stan-
dard deviation above the mean marginal 
prize in the sample by multiplying the 
standard deviations in Table 7 by the 
corresponding regression coefficient in 
Table 6.aa When the quality of players 
2?
 We say I.ES1PRIZ and 1.ES2PRI7. arc probably the 
two "best" marginal prize variables because they take 
account of how closely bunched competitors are 
around the player and because improving one's 
performance by three strokes relative to one's 
nearby after the third round is not 
included in the equation (Table 6, column 
(1)), such calculations suggest that these 
players would score 3.4 to 4.5 strokes 
lower on the final round of the tourna-
ment. When it is included (Table 6, 
columns (2)-(3)), these effects fall to 
roughly 1.9 to 3.0 strokes. Notably, even 
the latter effects are somewhat larger than 
the similar effects we found in our earlier 
paper that used U.S. data. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper and our earlier paper have 
provided nonexperimental evidence that 
tournaments do have incentive effects. In 
our earlier paper, we analyzed data 
from the 1984 United States Men's PGA 
Tour and the 1984 United States Senior 
Men's PGA Tour and found that the 
level and structure of prize money did 
influence players' performance. Higher 
prize levels led, ceteris paribus, to lower 
scores, although this effect occurred pri-
marily in the later rounds of a tourna-
ment, when fatigue had set in and it was 
competitors is not an easy task. On average, players 
in our sample improved their performance by .3 
strokes between the third and fourth rounds, and the 
standard deviation of their change in performance 
was 3.97 strokes. 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics—Marginal 
Prize Variables.3 
Variable 
DPRIZE 
UPRJZE 
MIOPRIZE 
LF.S 1PRIZ 
LES2PRIZ 
I.ES3PRIZ 
Mean 
.789 
.909 
.849 
1.058 
2.415 
3.895 
Stan-
dard 
Devia-
tion. 
3.746 
4.541 
3.433 
4.327 
7.846 
8.791 
Mini-
mum 
Value 
b 
b 
b 
b 
b 
b 
Maxi-
mum 
Value 
76.980 
76.980 
50.395 
76.980 
112.160 
126.035 
1
 See Table 5 for variable definitions. AH variables 
are measured in thousands of pounds. 
b
 Less than 0.5. 
more difficult for players to maintain 
concentration. Given a player's perfor-
mance on the first three rounds of a 
tournament, his performance on the last 
round also appeared, ceteris paribus, to 
depend on the marginal returns to effort 
he faced, with players who faced larger 
marginal returns achieving better scores. 
The level of prize money in tournaments 
also influenced who entered the tourna-
ments, with higher prize money attracting 
better players. 
The influence of tournament prizes on 
performance was observed in the data 
primarily for exempt players. As discussed 
in our earlier paper, this result may 
indicate either that exempt players are 
more responsive to the reward structure 
or that a tournament's prize level does not 
adequately reflect the reward structure 
that nonexempt players face, since these 
players must be concerned with how their 
finish in a tournament will influence their 
probability of qualifying for exempt status 
on the next year's tour. Evidence from the 
U.S. senior tour provided some support 
for the former hypothesis—that better 
players are, in fact, more responsive to 
financial incentives. 
Our analysis here, using data from the 
1987 Men's European PGA Tour, sup-
ports most of the above findings. Higher 
prize levels appear to lead to lower player 
scores in the European PGA tournaments, 
and higher marginal return to effort that 
players face on the last round of tourna-
ments apparently leads to lower final 
round scores. The responsiveness of per-
formance to prize money also appears to 
be greater on the European than on the 
U.S. tour. In contrast to the U.S. data, 
however, the European data yield only 
mixed evidence to support the view that 
exempt players are more responsive to 
financial incentives. 
Together, our two papers provide only 
an exploratory analysis of the incentive 
effects of tournaments, and there are a 
number of directions that future research 
might take. First, replication and exten-
sions using data from other sports in 
which absolute measures of output are 
available, the level and structure of 
prize money differs, and the form of 
tournaments differs would obviously be 
desirable. Professional bowling is particu-
larly attractive in this regard, because 
bowling tournaments have a match play 
element.23 
Second, all of our analyses are derived 
from simple two-person models that 
yield implications for the output/scores 
of an individual player. Generalization 
to n-person tournaments would yield 
implications about the entire distribution 
of scores one might expect to observe, 
and empirical analyses of the distribu-
tion of final scores could then be under-
taken. 
Third, our analyses assume that the 
tournament prize structure influences out-
put/scores through its effect on effort/' 
concentration levels. Players can also choose 
conservative strategies (for example, hit-
ting down the center of the fairway) or 
risky strategies (for example, trying to cut 
across a dogleg), and depending on a 
player's ability relative to the rest of the 
field, his rank after each round, or both, 
different strategies may be pursued. Mod-
els that also included the choice of 
strategies that differ in risk undoubtedly 
would yield additional empirical implica-
tions. 
Fourth, there are normative issues relat-
ing to the level and structure of prizes that 
we actually observe in tournaments. Can 
Research using data from professicma! bowling 
is currently being undertaken by Bognannn (forth-
coming). 
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we infer from this structure what the 
objective functions of the PGA Tour and 
tournament sponsors actually are? Can we 
estimate whether the marginal cost to 
sponsors of higher prize tournaments is 
less than, equal to, or greater than the 
marginal benefits they receive? To answer 
such questions will require going far 
beyond the scores of players in tourna-
ments and analyzing more generally the 
operations of the PGA Tour and its 
sponsors. 
Finally, although studies of sports tour-
naments are of interest in themselves, there 
is the broader question of the extent to which 
tournament theory can help to provide an 
explanation for the structure of compensa-
tion we observe among corporate execu-
tives. As is well known, situations in which 
opportunities exist for one executive to sab-
otage another's performance are not con-
ducive to tournament-type pay structures. 
One might, therefore, expect to see tourna-
ment-type pay structures used more fre-
quently when rivals can be effectively "sep-
arated" (for example, for managers of 
different branches of a firm) than when they 
work closely together.24 Nevertheless, devis-
ing ways to empirically address the rele-
vance of tournament theory should rank 
high on the research agenda of economists 
interested in compensation issues. 
For an extended discussion of this point, see 
Lazear (1989). 
Appendix 
Table Al: 1987 European PGA Tournaments Included in the Sample 
Tournament 
1. Moroccan Open 
2. Jersey Open 
3. Suze Open 
4. Cepsa Madrid Open 
5. Lancia Italian Open 
6. Peugeot Spanish Open 
7. Whyle & MacKay PGA 
8. London Standards Four Stars 
9. Dunhill British Masters 
10. Peugeot French Open 
11. Johnnie Walker Monte Carlo i 
12. Carrolls Irish Open 
Distribution of Tournaments by 
< 100,000£ 
100,000-150,000£ 
151,000-2O0,0OO£ 
200,500-250,000£ 
251,OO0-3O0,000£ 
> 30O,000£ 
Open 
Prize 
1 
4 
7 
6 
3 
2 
Total Prize 
Money 
(in Pounds) 
165,398 
98,170 
153,105 
165,000 
141,637 
175,200 
220,000 
138,500 
200,000 
253,200 
204,604 
216,895 
Money: 
Tournament 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
Bell's Scottish Open 
KLM Dutch Open 
Scandinavian Enterprise Open 
PLM Open 
Benson & Hedges International Open 
Lawrence Batley International 
German Open 
Ebel European Masters Swiss Open 
Panasonic European Open 
Lancome Trophy 
German Masters 
Total Prize 
Money 
(in Pounds) 
200,594 
181,170 
193,436 
145,998 
201,544 
141,544 
274,555 
339,093 
221,908 
300,750 
267,684 
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Table A2: Mean Percentage and Level of Prize Money Awarded Expost by Rank in the Tournaments 
Included in the Sample: Selected Ranks3 
Final 
Rank 
Mean Percentage. 
of Total Prize 
Mean Ixvel of 
Prize Manet (in Pounds) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
19 
20 
30 
40 
50 
16.3 
10.4 
5.8 
4.7 
3.6 
1.18 
1.13 
0.87 
0.61 
0.43 
34,867 
23,342 
11,918 
10,601 
7,642 
2,378 
1,975 
1,616 
1,479 
1,053 
a
 Authors' calculations from observations included in the sample. As noted in the text, the sample is confined 
to observations on the top 130 money winners during the year. The means for each rank are computed across 
a different number of observations because two or more golfers may tie for a rank in a given tournament, 
because no one may finish in a given rank in a given tournament (e.g., if two golfers tie for tenth, there is no 
eleventh-place finisher), or because a golfer who finished in a given rank in a tournament is not in our sample. 
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